2009 Military Coup
On June 28, 2009, the democratically elected President of Honduras, Manuel Zelaya, was deposed of his position in a military coup d’état led by U.S.-trained Honduran military generals. Following the military coup, U.S. officials refrained from condemning it as such and provided minimal acknowledgment of the state-led violence against the mass popular social movement that protested the coup on the streets of Honduras in the months that followed. Subsequently, the U.S. State Department actively worked to impede Zelaya’s return to the presidency, disregarding the demands of Hondurans and the international community, who demanded the restoration of democracy and the reinstitution of President Zelaya. Instead, the State Department pushed for new elections and bolstered Juan Orlando Hernández’s post-coup-regime to power.
The 2009 military coup in Honduras not only highlighted the lasting impact of U.S. training and intervention in the region but also set the stage for the turbulent period that followed. The leaders who orchestrated Zelaya’s ousting were U.S.-trained and held authoritative positions in military ground and air operations during the 2009 coup. General Romero Vásquez-Velásquez, a two-time U.S. Army School of the Americas (SOA) graduate (1976, 1984), served as the Chief of the Armed Forces of Honduras. Concurrently, General Luis Javier Prince-Suazo, a member of the SOA class of 1996, held the position of Chief of the Honduran Air Force during the 2009 coup.
On the day of the coup, Zelaya was forced out to Costa Rica via Soto Cano Air Base, which, since 1984, has served as the home base for the U.S.-led Joint Task Force-Bravo. Control over access into and out of the air base during the coup fell directly under the jurisdiction of the Chief of the Honduran Air Force and coup leader, General Prince-Suazo; while tactical and ground operations fell under the leadership of the Chief of the Armed Forces and coup leader, General Vásquez-Velásquez. The Honduran military, on the day of the coup, strategically cut off power across the country, effectively preventing the media from reporting on the unfolding military coup. The affiliation of the coup plotters with the U.S. Army School of the Americas, and their proximity to joint U.S.-Honduras military relations by way of Soto Cano Air Base symbolizes the enduring connection amongst U.S. influence and militarism, forced political transitions (military coups), and state-sanctioned violence against political dissent in Latin America.
U.S. Involvement Amidst Human Rights Abuses
In July of 2009, the Inter-American Human Rights Commission (IACHR) of the Organization of American States (OAS) condemned the serious violations of human rights, including the murder of Honduran protestors and journalists and detention of foreign journalists in Honduras as a result of militarized public repression following the coup. Shocking scenes of military forces clashing with protesters loomed over international news, amplifying global condemnation of the coup and de facto president Micheletti’s government. Non governmental organizations that opposed the coup, including Red Comal, a campesino developmental organization focused on alternatives to dominant agricultural economies, experienced direct attacks from the Honduran military ahead of the post coup elections, showcasing the intensifying crackdown on political dissent. The Honduran military raided the offices of the Red Comal, claiming to have a warrant to search for and confiscate guns or “articles which would threaten people.” The organization’s computers, documents, and cash were seized.
During this period, Honduran civil society faced significant political repression. Post-coup de facto president Roberto Micheletti suspended four articles in the constitution, depriving Hondurans of freedom of transit, public meetings unauthorized by security forces, and prohibiting the media from criticizing the new regime. Up to 4,000 Hondurans were illegally and unjustly detained for protesting the military coup.
In March of 2011, the Inter-American Human Rights Commission held hearings on the post-coup crisis. Various stakeholders, including human rights organizations, activists, and victims, presented evidence of human rights abuses such as beatings, detentions, torture, and executions. The Commission condemned the Honduran government’s actions against various groups, noting the Lobo administration’s difficulty in providing credible responses or justifications. The Commission cited violations including deaths, suppression of demonstrations, arbitrary detentions, and militarization, alongside concerns about increased police and military funding at the cost of health and education. It highlighted judicial corruption following the removal of judges who criticized the 2009 coup and called for profound reforms, urging the Honduran government to cease repression and respect human rights.
The OAS’ Inter-American Commission on Human Rights asserted that serious violations of human rights occurred, including “deaths, an arbitrary declaration of a state of emergency, suppression of public demonstrations through disproportionate use of force, criminalization of public protest, arbitrary detentions of thousands of persons, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment and grossly inadequate conditions of detention, militarization of Honduran territory, a surge in incidents of racial discrimination, violations of women’s rights, serious and arbitrary restrictions on the right to freedom of expression, and grave violations of political rights.”
Zelaya remarks on the impact of the United States’ role in the military coup of Honduras: “they’ve created shock forces, psychological war, dirty war.” The people most impacted by the violence of the U.S. Government’s shock forces and dirty war are the people of Honduras who have been fighting, at risk of unjust imprisonment, forced disappearance, and death, protesting the theft of their democratic rights for civic engagement and the destruction of their sovereign republic.
While meetings between U.S. government officials and the post coup Honduran government took place, political repression in Honduras continued unabated. Representatives of the Committee of Relatives of Detained-Disappeared Persons (COFADEH), documented over 120 murders of resistance members, including union leaders. By October 2010, COFADEH documented that a minimum of 157 community leaders associated with the coup resistance movement were forced into exile, a consequence of the ongoing political repression. This escalation in violence, including the targeted murders of journalists, predominantly transpired following the elections, which were mired in controversy yet recognized as valid by the U.S. Government, coinciding with the restoration of diplomatic relations with Honduras. Prominent environmental activists including Miriam Miranda of the National Fraternal Black Organization of Honduras (OFRANEH) was beaten, detained, and charged with sedition during a coup resistance protest.
Despite this turmoil, the U.S. administration lauded President Lobo’s government as a model of democracy and reconciliation, while continuing to fund Honduran security forces. This raised questions about U.S. complicity in the repression and highlighted a discrepancy between its stated commitment to human rights and democracy and its “diplomatic” actions in Honduras.
Presidents Daniel Ortega of Nicaragua, Hugo Chávez of Venezuela, Evo Morales of Bolivia and Manuel Zelaya of Honduras came together in political cooperation and economic integration under the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA). This alliance represented a significant move towards political and economic unity among Latin American and Caribbean nations. Image Source: Peoples Dispatch
Pre-Coup Diplomatic Reforms
Reflecting on his swift forced exile, former Honduran President Mel Zelaya (2006-2009) asserted in a 2019 news interview that U.S. government officials issued an ultimatum in response to his evolving diplomatic alliances with other Latin American countries, alliances that operated beyond the scope of U.S. influence and control. Zelaya revealed this intimidation tactic, stating:
“Well, look,the coup d’état, inexorably, marks a new form of U.S. meddling in our society. Ten years ago [(in 2009)], John Negroponte, [deputy] secretary of state, and President George W. Bush warned me and threatened me, when I was president of Honduras, saying that if I had relations with Hugo Chávez, then I would have problems with the United States. Six months after that warning, I was removed from power and removed from [Honduras]. The problem for the United States is that the friends of those who they consider their adversaries are not their friends. They’ve decided they are enemies of the United States, quite simply, because I was seeking better relations with the south, bringing in oil from Venezuela and getting financing for hydroelectric projects with [Brazil].” – Ousted Honduran President Manuel Zelaya
Zelaya shared a clearer picture of the motivations driving the United States Government to orchestrate a coup d’état in Honduras. In his reflection Zelaya underscores the U.S. Government’s forthcoming action to undermine the sovereignty of Honduras in order to prevent the Central American nation from moving into trade and economic relations with other Latin American nations like Venezuela and Brazil. By 2009, Zelaya integrated Honduras into the Venezuelan-led Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA) and Petrocaribe, two regional economic blocs independent of direct U.S. influence and control. Zelaya suggests that the U.S. Government interfered in Honduras’ internal and diplomatic relations to hinder his shift towards economic ties in Latin America. Such ties could have benefited the people of Honduras but would have meant distancing from U.S. influence and control over the nation’s diplomatic and economic affairs.
Zelaya posits that in 2009, the U.S. Government viewed him as an adversary because of his relation with Chavez and Venezuela, against whom the U.S. had targeted sanctions since 2005. The U.S. is keen on projecting its actions onto other countries. While it was clear that Hernández was engaged in the activities for which he has now been convicted, the U.S. concurrently criticized Venezuela. It labeled Maduro a drug trafficker, using this accusation as a pretext for imposing severe sanctions. These measures have led to further destabilization, affecting millions in Venezuela. In 2009, Zelaya’s relationship and political cooperation with Chavez of Venezuela provided sufficient motivation for Negroponte of the U.S. State Department and former U.S. President Bush to issue an ominous warning. This warning foreshadowed Zelaya’s exile through a military coup just a few months later.
Pre-Coup Domestic Reforms
In the lead up to the coup, President Zelaya introduced significant domestic reforms aimed at improving the well-being of Hondurans. These policies included free public education for youth, raising the average minimum wages by 60%, and progressive social welfare measures like cash transfers and free electricity to help reduce absolute poverty. Additionally, as labor and social movement historian Dana Frank analyzes in The Long Honduran Night , Zelaya “opened the door to restoring the land rights of small farmers, and, most importantly, stopped multiple power grabs by the elites, who sought to privatize publicly owned ports, education system, electrical system, and anything else they could get their hands on.”
Zelaya engaged in discussions with left-wing social movements in Honduras that were critical of the U.S. military presence. Many of these groups advocated for a “constituyente,” an elected constituent assembly that if assembled, would have been tasked with crafting a more progressive iteration of the 1982 Honduran constitution; which was formulated and adopted under U.S. guidance at the height of U.S.-funded Cold War operations in Central America.
Zelaya’s choice to hold a non-binding poll, asking Hondurans whether the issue of the constitutional assembly should be included in the upcoming elections, served as the contentious pretext for the 2009 military coup. Despite lacking substantiated evidence, Zelaya’s opponents accused him of trying to amend the constitution to extend his presidency indefinitely. They collaborated with the top two U.S.-trained Honduran military generals, the aforementioned General Vásquez-Velásquez and General Prince-Suazo, to unlawfully remove and exile Zelaya before the constituyente referendum could occur.
To legitimize the military coup and anti democratic takeover, the president of Congress Roberto Micheletti was swiftly inaugurated as de facto and interim president just hours after Zelaya was exiled. Meanwhile, Hondurans took to the streets in protest, resulting in massive demonstrations that paralyzed capital and trade. In retaliation, Micheletti imposed curfews and suspended constitutional rights, moves which would prove indicative of what the next few years in Honduras would look like. Michelitti suspended the freedom of the press and the freedom of transit, and public gatherings not pre authorized by security forces. Michelletti’s post-coup period allowed for arbitrary searches and detentions without warrants. According to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, as many as 4,000 individuals were unlawfully detained for participating in or being proximate to post-coup protests and demonstrations.
U.S. Government Renders Honduran Democracy Moot
The day after the coup, on June 29th, 2009, President Obama initially joined the rest of the world, including the United Nations General Assembly in recognizing Zelaya as the lawful president. However, unlike its counterparts and to the detriment of Honduran democracy, the U.S. Government failed to officially condemn the military coup d’état or call for the reinstatement of President Zelaya.
On July 7, 2009, just ten days after the coup, the U.S. State Department’s approach, particularly that of then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, was calculated. Despite global condemnation and calls for the reinstatement of Zelaya, including a strong stance by the Organization of American States demanding the “immediate and unconditional return of President [Zelaya] to his constitutional duties,” the U.S. Government ignored public outcry. On the contrary, the U.S. Government blocked an Organization of American States (OAS) resolution for immediate reinstatement of Zelaya, pushing instead for mediated negotiations, thus making itself the official arbitrator in the matter.
The United States Government could have made a choice to heed the calls of Hondurans and the international community by using its hegemonic influence to support the return of president Zelaya and the restoration of democracy in Honduras. Instead, Secretary of State Clinton officially announced that “the United States had persuaded both sides to agree to negotiations,” effectively placing the U.S. Government as official arbitrator of said “negotiations.” By shifting the power away from the neutral Organization of American States (OAS) and towards itself, the U.S. Government successfully imposed control over the issue. Unlike the U.S., a majority of the OAS nations called for Zelaya’s presidency to be reinstated. The OAS, in turn, refused to legitimize the post-coup regime.
On November 29, 2009, the U.S. State Department announced its endorsement of elections under the post coup government without the prior reinstatement of Zelaya, thus eliminating any incentive for coup supporters to permit Zelaya to complete his mandate. Declassified documents indicate that Honduran military officers visited Washington to advocate for the coup, and there are indications that they received support and guidance from U.S. military officials.
The official U.S. government position towards post-coup Honduras is further evidenced by Clinton’s biographical recollection in Hard Choices , in which she discussed strategizing a plan to promptly “restore order” in Honduras while confirming the U.S. Government’s preference for new presidential elections. Clinton admitted that she spoke with leaders in the Western Hemisphere about “a plan to restore order in Honduras and ensure that free and fair elections could be held quickly and legitimately, which would render the question of Zelaya moot.” Thus, showcasing that Clinton and the United States Government were less motivated to support Zelaya’s reinstatement instead, opting for a “solution” that would ensure business as usual in Honduras could continue as soon as possible. However, the violent repression present during and leading up to the post coup elections in 2009 indicated otherwise. Upon further inspection, it is now evident that the 2009 coup and elections – and subsequent fraudulent elections of JOH in 2013 and 2017 – undermined the Honduran state and democracy, setting a path that consolidated power with post-coup leadership and culminated in the narco-state.
Looking back at how fiercely the U.S. Government leadership pushed to derail Zelaya’s reinstatement and how quickly they rushed to replace Zelaya’s leadership with new elections in the midst of the suspension of several democratic freedoms, it becomes clear that the 2009 elections were instrumental in consolidating the making of and the legitimization of JOH’s post-coup narco-state. Secretary Clinton and the U.S. Government colluded in rendering the question of democracy and of free and fair elections in Honduras moot.
The 2009 presidential elections, boycotted by Honduran voters in protest, and denounced by the international community , further highlighted the antidemocratic maneuvering towards new elections following the coup. Despite low voter turnout and international questions of legitimacy, the U.S. Government chose to recognize the election results , a decision criticized in Honduras and internationally for undermining the democratic process and the autonomy of Hondurans.
The U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of Global Public Affairs ironically celebrated the 2009 elections in a press release stating, “This shows that given the opportunity to express themselves, the Honduran people have viewed the election as an important part of the solution to the political crisis in their country.” Meanwhile, Hondurans were still facing gunfire and illegal imprisonment for exercising their suspended democratic right to freedom of assembly and free speech. It is indispensable to note that the freedom of the press to critique their own government was strategically targeted. Years after the 2009 coup and election, these rights would continue to be repressed by Honduran security forces whom the U.S. Government continued to fund and train.
Simultaneously, as protests and repression of dissidence by security forces continued in Honduras, U.S. officials extended a warm welcome to the new post-coup President of Honduras, Porfirio “Pepe” Lobo. A 2010 press release from the U.S. Embassy quoted U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Craig Kelly congratulating President Lobo on his election and expressing the United States’ willingness to work with his new government. Kelly encouraged Honduran leaders to “support democracy” and normalize Honduras’s international ties.
Porfirio Lobo’s “victory” in these antidemocratic elections – which also made JOH the President of Congress – served to legitimize the new post-coup government and to bolster narco-statesmen to positions of ultimate leadership in Honduras. The quick recognition of the elections by the U.S. Government signaled a prioritization of supporting a president that accommodates U.S. interests over democratic integrity and respect for Honduran sovereignty. In doing so, the U.S.-backed post coup elections ushered in a neoliberal government that would continue to serve ongoing U.S. Government economic interests in Honduras. Having successfully prevented Zelaya’s from returning to the presidency and officially recognizing and legitimizing a new president subservient to U.S. policy interests in Honduras, U.S. Officials under the Obama Administration, declared that “the election [was] a significant step in Honduras’s return to the democratic and constitutional order.”
This period in Honduran history underscores a pattern in U.S. foreign policy where strategic and economic interests often trump stated democratic principles. The United States’ actions, particularly in blocking Zelaya’s reinstatement and endorsing a quick election, suggest an underhanded approach that favors the establishment of a neoliberal government aligned with U.S. economic and military interests. This approach effectively undermines the democratic aspirations of the Honduran people and sets a precedent for future U.S. interventions in the region, paving the way for continued influence and control over Honduras’ political and economic future.
Post-Coup Pivots
According to a July, 2012 report by The Defense Technical Information Center, a repository for research and information of the United States Department of Defense (DOD), stated:
“Upon taking office in January 2010, President Lobo…entered into negotiations with the international financial institutions, and quickly secured an emergency stand-by agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as well as much needed development financing from the World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank. Under the agreements, Lobo committed to undertaking structural reforms.”
During Lobo’s contested presidency, he implemented several significant changes that diverged from Honduras’ trajectory under Zelaya’s leadership. Among these divergent actions, Lobo secured loans from the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank, all while pledging to implement severe austerity measures and economic restructuring.
Labor historian Dana Frank reported, “In accordance with U.S. wishes, in February and March [of 2010] the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) reopened the spigot of loans to Honduras for a total of $430 million” and added an “additional $280 million”. However, Latin American governments including Nicaragua, Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, and Venezuela refused to recognize Lobo’s government as legitimate which blocked Honduras’ re-admittance into the Organization of American States. In response, during a March 4th 2010 press conference, Secretary of State Clinton said that the U.S. Government shared in the “condemnation of the coup” but urged the global community – and the members of the OAS more specifically, that “…it [was] time to move forward and ensure that such disruptions of democracy do not and cannot happen in the future.” Clinton also stated that she had just notified [U.S.] Congress that [the U.S. Government] would be restoring aid to Honduras.” The $31 million in U.S. funds that had been withheld from Honduras after the coup, and significant additional funds from the U.S.-led international financial institutions would now be made available to the post coup government of Lobo and JOH–who at that time was the president of Congress. Days after Clinton’s announcement, “on March 16, [2010] the Inter-American Development Bank announced it was restoring another $500 million” to Honduras.
Consequently, this new spigot of loans pushed Hondurans further from the social welfare initiatives and economic sovereignty that Zelaya sought to advance. Rather than maintaining Zelaya’s course, the political shift facilitated by the 2009 coup and subsequent election ensnared Honduras and its people in long-term debt with U.S.-led international financial institutions such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the Interamerican Development Bank.
In diametric opposition to Zelaya’s vision of economic prosperity for the peoples of Honduras, Lobo executed harsh structural reforms at the expense of the peoples and natural resources of Honduras, this included a tax reform purportedly designed to increase revenue, an energy reform to more narrowly target subsidies, a reform of public sector pension funds … and a measure de-indexing teachers wages from changes in the minimum wage. This so-called “effort to slow the growth of expenditure on public sector salaries” took a direct cut at the hard-earned incomes and future earnings of Hondurans, who to date continue to be among the most impoverished citizens in the Western Hemisphere.
Analyzing Honduras’ national debt data from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) reveals a significant trend. During Zelaya’s presidency, which began in 2006, there was a notable decline in national debt, reaching a low of 2.2 billion U.S. dollars. However, following the 2009 coup, there was a stark reversal, with debt levels experiencing a dramatic increase. IMF projections indicate that by 2028, the national debt will soar to a staggering 23.25 billion U.S. dollars. This substantial rise can largely be attributed to the economic policies implemented under the tenures of Lobo and Juan Orlando Hernández. The ramifications of this debt are particularly striking when considering that in Latin America, Honduras has the highest proportion of its population living on less than 3.20 U.S. dollars per day. This juxtaposition underscores the immense burden and long-term consequences of the Honduras’ post coup debt crisis.
Table Source: Washington Office on Latin America
The allocation of resources in Honduras from 2014 to 2017, under the presidency of Juan Orlando Hernández, sharply tilted towards militarization at the expense of societal stability and the well-being of Hondurans. JOH’s administration earmarked a substantial fraction of the national budget for defense—a total of 23.7 billion lempiras, which amounts to around 947.1 million U.S. dollars. This investment in military might, occurring during a period marked by state repression and widespread impunity, emphasized the JOH government’s prioritization in the country. Evidently, such fiscal choices came at the detriment of critical social services. While the government boasted about declines in murder rates and displayed a fortified military presence in public spaces, essential services like education and healthcare suffered from underfunding. This myopic focus on defense, to the point of treating citizens and organized civil society into potential combatants, not only exacerbated the climate of fear but also left the root causes of instability—such as poverty, inequality, and corruption—largely unaddressed. Far from safeguarding its people, the JOH administration’s spending pattern underscores a disconcerting disregard for the holistic needs of Honduran society, leading to a governance paradigm that prioritized the consolidation of power in the interest of profit over the prosperity of its people.
For unaware taxpayers in the United States, the sobering reality emerges of significant U.S. resources being funneled into “defense” budgets within Honduras. This financial support, as indicated by a rise in Defense Department funding to $4.6 million in FY2014 from $3.5 million for counternarcotics programs in FY2013, underscores a prioritization of militarized security measures over the stability and human rights of the Honduran populace. The implementation of a “Security Tax” in Honduras exacerbates this issue, extracting a portion of incomes to finance the military police, thus drawing criticism for enabling corrupt officials to shield incriminating evidence and avoid prosecution. Moreover, the opacity of the Honduran budget, especially concerning the Security Tax purported to collect between $70 million to $80 million annually, leaves critical questions unanswered about the allocation of these funds and the impact on the Honduran people. The U.S.’s commitment to security assistance, fraught with concerns about human rights abuses and the promotion of damaging economic development, must be scrutinized for its actual contribution to sustainable aid and genuine community support. The true cost of these defense budgets, paid for by U.S. taxpayers and at the expense of impoverished Hondurans, becomes a stark revelation of misplaced priorities in foreign aid and the urgent need for transparent and responsible governance.